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Abstract
Adaptive behavior often exploits generalizations from past experience by applying them judiciously in new situations. This
requires a means of quantifying the relative importance of prior experience and current information, so they can be
balanced optimally. In this study, we ask whether the brain generalizes in an optimal way. Specifically, we used Bayesian
learning theory and fMRI to test whether neuronal responses reflect context-sensitive changes in ambiguity or uncertainty
about experience-dependent beliefs. We found that the hippocampus expresses clear ambiguity-dependent responses that
are associated with an augmented rate of learning. These findings suggest candidate neuronal systems that may be
involved in aberrations of generalization, such as over-confidence.
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Introduction
Successful behavior in new situations often requires us to apply
‘rules-of-thumb’. However, acquiring and applying abstract rules
from limited experience presents a fundamental computational
problem [1]: in which both over- or under-generalization must be
avoided [2,3,4,5,6]. Despite their importance, little is known about
how neuronal systems learn these rules, and how the delicate
balance between past and present information is maintained.
Evolutionary arguments suggest that the use of previously learned
rules when generalizing to new situations increases adaptive fitness
by optimizing behavior [7]. This raises the key question of whether
and how generalization is optimized [8]. In this work, we examine
whether human subjects combine previously learned rules and
current information in an optimal way and identify the brain
systems that underlie this combination. Using Bayesian learning
theory to specify optimal generalization, we looked for its neural
correlates. In particular, we drew on existing evidence that points
to the hippocampus as a key structure that is implicated in learning
the specifics of a new situation, when previously learned rules may
not apply [9,10].
Probabilistic inference in a natural environment is confounded
by multiple sources of uncertainty [11,12,13,14], including
objective randomness and subjective ignorance [14]. Uncertainty
is a key concept here because the confidence about prior beliefs
should be weighed against the confidence about new information,
when deciding whether to generalize those beliefs to a new
situation. Classical reinforcement learning models (e.g. [15,16]) do
not represent uncertainty or use generalization to guide learning
and behavior: these schemes simply learn the expected value of
action-states and only prosper in environments where the current
state is sufficient to specify a successful action: see [17] for a
critique and extension. Having said this, several other RL schemes
are based on some form of non-probabilistic function approxima-
tion and therefore support generalization (see Chapter 8 in [18] for
discussion and recent RL approaches in neuroscience that
consider generalization in the spatial [19] and temporal [20]
case). While recent RL developments in neuroscience incorporate
some notion of uncertainty [21], learning and generalization are
typically non-probabilistic. In this work we ask if learnt
generalizations are accompanied with due uncertainty [22], as
prescribed by probability theory.
At the behavioral level, human subjects readily abstract
probabilistic rules and use them to generalize [8]. Furthermore,
they can distinguish different sources of uncertainty: the
unavoidable or irreducible randomness of certain events versus
subjective ignorance about the world [12,13,23,24,25]. The latter
resembles the concept of subjective ambiguity in economics and
represents uncertainty about objective risks. For example, the risk
(or irreducible randomness) associated with a fair coin toss is high
(50:50); however, there may be subjective ambiguity as to whether
the coin is itself fair. This paper examines the function and
mechanisms of generalization in the face of ambiguity. While there
are good reasons to restrict the term ambiguity to complete
ignorance [26], we use the term more inclusively to denote the
level of uncertainty about the outcome probabilities. This is akin to
estimation [14] or second-order [26] uncertainty (i.e., uncertainty
about uncertainty). Ambiguity is subjective and reference-depen-
dent: it ranges from complete ignorance to near certainty and,
crucially, can be reduced by generalization in a Bayes-optimal
fashion [8]. In other words, if subjects consider their current
situation in the light of past experience, they can exploit
similarities between the past and present to reduce their ambiguity
[27,28]. In our example, ambiguity about a new coin will be
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ability to generalize over similar situations is seen readily in
behavior and learning [8,14].
In this study, we examined the neuronal correlates of
generalization with a special focus on the hippocampus: The
hippocampus is involved in generalization [29,30,31,32,33,34]
and shows activations that are sensitive to objective uncertainty or
risk [23,35]. In this paper, we asked if hippocampal responses also
report subjective uncertainty or ambiguity that changes with
experience. Specifically, we tested for ambiguity-dependent
hippocampal responses, when probabilistic nature of outcomes
had to be learned. Furthermore, we hoped to show behaviorally
that learning rates were greater in contexts that had more
ambiguity. We addressed these questions using a model of our
experimental task and, tested whether Bayesian updates or
learning could explain behavioral and neurophysiological respons-
es, as measured with fMRI.
Materials and Methods
Subjects and procedure
Nineteen subjects (age 19–31, 11 female) were recruited from
the UCL psychology Dept subject pool. All subjects gave informed
consent, before reading a brief description of the task which was
then performed under fMRI. The study protocol was approved by
the local UCL ethics committee.
Image acquisition and analysis
Image acquisition. Images were acquired on a 3 T Allegra
head scanner (Siemens Medical Systems) with a head coil for RF
transmission and signal reception. We used BOLD signal sensitive
T2*-weighted transverse single-shot gradient-echo echo-planar
imaging (EPI; flip angle 90u; bandwidth BW, 3551 Hz/pixel;
phase-encoding (PE) direction, anterior–posterior; bandwidth in
PE direction BWPE, 47.3 Hz/pixel; TE, 30 ms; effective TR,
2600 ms). An automatic 3D-shim procedure was performed at the
beginning of each experiment. Each volume contained 40 slices of
2-mm thickness (1-mm gap between slices; field of view, 1926192-
mm
2; matrix size, 64664). Sensitivity losses due to susceptibility
artifacts were minimized by applying a z-shim gradient moment of
0.4 mT/m, a slice tilt of 30u, and a positive PE gradient polarity
[36], [37]. Each subject underwent one scanning session, with
three breaks. The task was self-timed, and therefore the duration
of each session depended on the subject. The first five volumes of
each session were discarded to ensure steady-state longitudinal
magnetization.
Whole-brain anatomical scans were acquired using a modified
driven equilibrium Fourier transform (MDEFT) sequence with
optimized parameters [38]. One hundred seventy-six sagittal
partitions were acquired with an image matrix of 2566224
(read6phase) and twofold oversampling in read direction (head/
foot direction) to prevent aliasing (isotropic spatial resolution 1-
mm;15u; TR/TE/TI, 7.92 ms/2.4 ms/910 ms; BW, 195 Hz/
pixel). Spin tagging in the neck was performed to avoid flow
artifacts in the vicinity of blood vessels. The flip angle of the
tagging pulse was chosen to be 160u to account for B1 losses in the
neck. Special RF excitation pulses were used to compensate for B1
inhomogeneity of the transmit coil in superior/inferior and
anterior/posterior directions. Images were reconstructed using a
standard 3D Fourier Transform, followed by modulus calculation.
Image analysis. Functional imaging data were analyzed with
statistical parametric mapping (SPM8; Wellcome Trust Centre for
Neuroimaging; www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). EPI images were
generated off-line using a generalized reconstruction method
based on the measured EPI k-space trajectory to minimize
ghosting. Motion-corrected images were co-registered to the
individual’s anatomical MDEFT image and spatially normalized
to the Montreal Neurological Institute T1 reference brain
template (re-sampled voxel size: 26262-mm).
The experimental paradigm
While our goal was to identify domain-general computational
processes, the paradigm was framed as a social inference task:
Subjects were told that two groups of thirty individuals had
completed a marketing survey. Subjects were then asked to guess,
over ten consecutive trials, whether each individual would choose
a ‘blue’ or ‘purple’ product. Subjects were told they would be paid
‘in proportion to the number of correct guesses’ and that the two
groups were ‘geographically and economically unlike one
another’. Trial cues (individuals) were faces from the Sterling
data-set, whose group membership was indicated by the symbol ‘*’
or ‘o’ (see Figure 1). Each trial comprised the following sequence:
1) an individual’s face was presented along with the symbol
indicating their group membership; 2) the response options (blue
and purple squares) were then presented, after which 3) the subject
responded and 4) received feedback about whether their guess was
correct or incorrect. The timeline for a single trial is shown in
Figure 1. If subjects did not guess within one second, they were
shown the instruction ‘ACT FASTER!’. The subject’s guess was
highlighted until feedback was delivered. Correct guesses were
signaled with an auditory beep (500 milliseconds of 500 Hz sine
wave) and accumulated in a score bar at the bottom of the screen.
Incorrect guesses were indicated by a 500 millisecond burst of
white noise (with no increase in their score).
Unbeknown to subjects, individuals from one group had similar
preferences, while the other group had more between-individual
variability. This meant that subjects had to make guesses about
choices in two distinct contexts established by the group an
individual belonged to: in the generalization context (GC), all
individuals chose ‘purple’ with probability p~0:8. In the ambiguous
context (AC), ‘blue’ was probabilistically chosen (p~0:8) by half of
the group members and ‘purple’ (p~0:8) by the other half. To
reiterate, subjects were presented with the same face ten times and
had to guess whether the individual preferred blue or purple. Each
individual was identified as belonging to one group or the other.
Every individual preferred one color that was chosen 80% of the
time. In the generalization context, all group members preferred
the same color, while in the ambiguous context, individual group
members preferred blue or purple with equal probability. In both
contexts, subjects could learn about any given individual over ten
trials.
The generalization context therefore contained a probabilistic
rule prescribing the best guess, even in the absence of learning
about an individual’s preferences. Conversely, in the ambiguous
context, subjects had to learn about individual preferences because
their group membership provided no clues about what they would
Author Summary
Intelligent behavior requires flexible responses to new
situations, which exploit learned principles or abstractions.
When no such principles exist, the imperative is to learn
quickly from scratch. Behaviorally, we show that subjects
learn action-reward relationships in a manner that enables
them to generalize rules to new situations. Our fMRI results
show that when subjects have no evidence that such a rule
exists, medial temporal lobe responses (that reflect
uncertainty) predict their augmented learning.
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the same individual was presented for ten consecutive trials. The
blocks alternated between AC and GC, with a new individual
(face) for each block. This resulted in 30|10|2~600 trials, for
thirty individuals, presented ten times for two groups.
The blue and purple options were presented with equal
probability on the left and right of the screen on each trial.
Individuals (faces) were randomly reassigned to either group,
between subjects. All subjects experienced the same feedback
contingencies (with randomly reassigned cues). Subjects had three
short breaks during the task: for each they were first cued
‘PLEASE HAVE A SHORT REST AND RELAX’ before being
prompted to restart thirty seconds later: ‘OK! PLEASE PRESS
ANY KEY TO CONTINUE’.
Bayesian modeling versus conventional fMRI analyses
Bayesian learning theory predicts that subjects should learn
more quickly about a new individual from the ambiguous group,
relative to an individual from the generalization group. This is
based upon the assumption that subjects are making Bayes-
optimal guesses using a notion of group or context. The increase in
learning rate with higher levels of ambiguity is related to increases
in learning rate in situations with a high degree of volatility [39]
(see below). At the neuronal level, we predicted that increases in
learning rate would selectively engage hippocampal processing in
the ambiguous context. In other words, hippocampal activation
should track changes in ambiguity about an individual’s preference
as it alternates between AC (high ambiguity) and GC (low
ambiguity) blocks. To quantify ambiguity, we assumed subjects
were ideal Bayesian observers who used a model of probabilistic
outcomes. We focused on two alternative models to predict subject
responses, M1 and M2. Under M1, Bayesian learning combines
new information with existing generalizations based on group
membership. Conversely, M2 accumulates information about
every individual independently, without the benefit of generaliza-
tion.
To make optimal guesses about the choices of each group
member, subjects have to infer their preferences i.e. the probability
that this individual will choose a particular option, say ‘purple’.
We denote this probability with hi[½0,1 . The information
following each trial is equivalent to observing the outcome of a
biased coin. We use the random variable oni to denote whether the
choice of the ith individual was ‘purple’ (oni~1) or ‘blue’ (oni~0):
i[1,...,I in trial ni[1,...,10 (subjects encountered I~30
individuals in each of the two groups).
In what follows, we consider alternative models that subjects
might have used to infer the hi[½0,1 . We start with a model that
permits generalization and then turn to a version that precludes
generalization. We also consider a few alternative models that can
be considered as special cases that are of interest from an RL
perspective.
Models
M1: Bayes-optimal generalization. The critical feature of
M1 is that guesses about each individual are informed by
knowledge about group membership. This model supposes that
Figure 1. This schematic shows the structure of each trial. A face was presented for 600 ms before two choice options were displayed. The
choice options cue the subjects’ guess, which was then indicated by a yellow border around the selected option. Audio and visual feedback indicated
whether the choice was rewarded (correct) or not (incorrect).
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002346.g001
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generalization context, subjects should be more confident about a
new individual from the unambiguous group, relative to the
ambiguous group that provides no contextual clues. This
differential uncertainty (ambiguity) is our focus. For simplicity,
we assumed that subjects generalize within, but not between,
groups. In other words, learning in one context was independent
of learning in the other. An additional hierarchical level would
permit generalization across contexts (e.g., the relative size of each
group) and could be modeled with an extension of the Bayesian
framework described below [40].
The form of our model appeals to behavioral evidence that
human rule learning resembles non-parametric Bayesian inference
[41]. It is also related to a previous [42] Bayesian formulation of
rule-learning. (While the latter model focuses on Pavlovian
learning, it resembles M1 through inferring the hidden number
of subgroups or ‘latent causes’ [42]). In our model, subjects
represent the (preferences of) individuals, h1,...,hI,hNEW fg where
I is the total number of individuals encountered so far. Subjects
represent individual preferences by assigning individuals to
subgroups, according to their similarity. Note that while subjects
observe group membership, subgroup membership is hidden:
There are two hidden subgroups in the ambiguous context,
preferring either blue or purple, but only one in the generalization
context. By first finding the number and nature of subgroups,
optimal Bayesian assignment avoids over-generalization (e.g.
incorrectly labeling a new blue-preferring individual as belonging
to a known purple-preferring subgroup) and under-generalizing
(e.g. failing to recognize that a new purple-preferring individual
belongs to a known purple-preferring subgroup). This type of
learning has had considerable success in modeling category
learning in humans [41] and ‘rationalizes’ non-Bayesian models
of generalization in reinforcement learning [43] (see below).
We assume that subjects store the number of times (out of Ni)
the ith individual chose ‘purple’. The cumulative counts up to the
present trial t, are denoted by dt~f(yi,Ni{yi)g
I
i~1 where
yi~
P Ni
ni~1
oni. Subjects model their cumulative observations yi as
drawn from a mixture of Binomial distributions of the form
Bin(yDN,h). Being ignorant of the mixing distribution h,w e
assume they use a Dirichlet process G over h, with concentration
parameter a and base distribution G0 [corresponding to the
uninformative conjugate Beta distribution Beta(1,1)]. These
define the base measure aG0. The resulting probabilistic model is
yiDhi*Bin(Ni,hi)
hiDG*G
GDG0,a*DP(G0,a)
ð1Þ
Here 0R*S0 means R has the distribution S; so the right hand
side specifies a distribution. The Dirichlet process, DP, is thus a
distribution on distributions and models ambiguity. Because
realizations of a DP are discrete with probability one, these
models can be viewed as probability measures consisting of a
weighted sum of point masses [44,45]; i.e., countably infinite
mixtures
G~
X ?
k~1
pkd(h
 
k)*DP(G0,a) ð2Þ
Here d(x) is a point mass at a single point x, pk is a stick-breaking
process and h
 
k is distributed as G0 [46].
The implicit form of generalization is more transparent when
we integrate over G to obtain a prior over hi in terms of successive
conditional distributions (see [46] for a measure-theoretic proof of
this integral)
hiDh1,...,hi{1*
1
i{1za
X i{1
j~1
dh j
  
zaG0
"#
ð3Þ
This means the prior belief about one individual hi depends on
knowledge about others sampled from the population,
P i{1
j~1
dh j
  
,a s
well as the initial distribution G0. This completes our description of
M1 in terms of a likelihood (in Eq. 1) and prior (in Eq. 2/3).
To predict subject’s responses we require M1’s posterior belief
about the behavioral contingencies. This quantifies the ambiguity
as well as the value of their response options. For posterior
inference, one can obtain a sample from the posterior of
h~fh1,...,hIg by simulating a Markov chain whose equilibrium
distribution is the desired posterior distribution [47]. The simplest
approach is to repeatedly sample hi from its conditional
distribution, given both the data and all other hj=i, denoted by
h{i. This distribution therefore combines the likelihood of hi and
the prior, conditional on h{i. This conditional prior for an
individual based on previous individuals is given by
hiDh{i*
1
I{1za
X
j=i
dh j
  
zaG0
"#
ð4Þ
and derives from the previous equation by noting that i is the last
of I observations (i.e. by assuming the hi are exchangeable).
Introducing the likelihood, this yields the following conditional
posterior distribution:
hiDh{i,yi*b
X
j=i
Bin yiDNj,hj
  
dh j
  
zba
ð
Bin yiDNi,h ðÞ dG0(h)Qið5Þ
Where Qi is the posterior over hi, based on the prior G0 and the
single observation yi with likelihood Bin yiDNi,hi ðÞ , i.e. Beta
(hiD1zyi,1zNi{yi). Here, b is chosen to ensure that
b
X
i=j
Bin yiDNj,hj
  
za
ð
Bin yiDNi,h ðÞ dG0(h)
"#
~1:
This Bayesian model is related to the non-Bayesian RL model of
[43] mentioned in the introduction. In that RL model, each cue is
first ‘classified’ before reinforcement learning. A cue is either
assigned to a known class of cues based on similarity, or designated
exceptional and given its own class. Both perceptual similarity and
predictive similarity play a role: do two cues look the same? do
they predict the same outcomes? Regarding the latter, negative
prediction errors from RL reduce perceived similarity between cues in
a separate recognition system, thereby promoting discrimination over
generalization [43]. Our focus is on this predictive similarity. To
derive optimal generalization, we define predictive similarity as the
likelihood of an outcome, given a cue (rather than the inverse
magnitude of a negative prediction error). In particular, a cue’s
past associations determine if it will be assigned to a known class
based on similarity, defined by Bin yiDNj,hj
  
, or assigned to its
own class with probability ba
Ð
Bin yiDNi,h ðÞ dG0(h). The hyper-
parameter a controls this tradeoff between generalization and
discrimination and can itself be learned [48].
Learning and Generalization under Ambiguity
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Beta hD1,1 ðÞ , which is conjugate to the likelihood, calculating the
integral
Ð
Bin yiDNi,h ðÞ dG0(h) and sampling from Qi are straight-
forward. The simplest algorithm [47] for Gibbs sampling from the
full posterior p(h1,...,hI,hNEWDdt) including hNEW is (see [47,48]
for further details):
For i~1,...,I :
RDraw a new value from hiDh{i,yi as defined above.
With probability
a
I{a
draw hNEW from the base distribution G0.
ROtherwise, uniformly draw one existing fhi : i~1,...,Ig and assign
its value to hNEW.
This procedure approximates the trial-by-trial evolution of
posterior belief about preferences, p(h1,...,hI,hNEWDdt). Once the
Markov chain has reached equilibrium, we use a sample of size S
from that distribution. Furthermore, any marginal posterior of
interest p(hiDdt) or p(hNEWDdt) is approximated simply as the
univariate component of this joint sample [49].
We used two measures of this time-dependent posterior as
explanatory variables to predict the behavioral and neurophysi-
ological responses of each subject. Firstly, we operationalized the
ambiguity about each new individual using the Shannon entropy
Ht~H(p(hNEWDdt)). To evaluate this entropy, univariate samples
from p(hNEWDdt) were first binned into L~20 bins to provide an
approximate discrete probability mass function with ^ p pl~#
fhNEW[lth bing=S. In this case, we have H&
P L
l~1
^ p pl log^ p pl. This
uncertainty measure characterizes the ambiguity about a new
individual, as generalized from experience with other individuals
in the group. A differential entropy between AC/GC reflects both
the number of subgroups (clusters) and uncertainty about the
parameters describing those subgroups. To see this more clearly
take an extreme case where all I individuals encountered so far
have been attributed to one subgroup, h1~h2~...~hI~c. This
subgroup, characterized by a parameter setting of c, is therefore
strongly favored as an a priori explanation for new individuals (i.e.
strong generalization). Applying this condition to Eq. 3 gives
hNEWDh1,...,hI*
1
Iza
Id c ðÞ zaG0 ½ 
Intuitively,
I
Iza
probability mass now rests on just one point mass
(for small a this is all the mass). This predictive distribution is
therefore less ‘dispersed’ than if there were two or more subgroups
(i.e. it has lower entropy). For this reason, when Ht is small,
learning is more strongly biased towards belief in one subgroup. In
this sense, the entropy can be regarded as a proxy for ambiguity
that dictates the ‘learning rate’ or the sensitivity to new
information. We used this entropy measure to identify the
neurophysiological correlates of ambiguity, using fMRI responses.
We have emphasized that greater prior ambiguity (i.e. higher
number of inferred subgroups/higher predictive entropy) is
accompanied by a diminished a priori bias. This affords
observations more influence over posterior belief. Another
influential hypothesis is that uncertainty influences choice by
promoting exploration itself [50,51] i.e. what to learn about vs.
how fast to learn in the current situation. To simplify things, we
chose a task with no exploration-exploitation trade-off. Specifical-
ly, because every trial in our task provides feedback on the value of
the chosen action and counterfactual information about the other
unchosen action, there is no information to be gained from
exploring the less valuable action.
Subjects do not know the true expected reward, hi,TRUE,f o r
choosing ‘purple’ when faced with the ith individual (they do not
know that individual’s preference). Let gM1
niz1 then denote their
subjective, expected reward for guessing ‘purple’ on the niz1th trial
faced with the ith individual, following a total of t trials under M1.
This expectation is defined by weighting possible values of hi
according to their current plausibility, giving gM1
niz1~
Ð
hip hiDdt ðÞ dhi.
This is just the posterior expectation of hi and can be approximated
by
gM1
niz1&
1
S
X S
s~1
hi,s ð6Þ
Here, each hi,s is an MCMC sample from the posterior p(hiDdt)
conditional on all observations to date. This replaces an analytic
expectation with an empirical expectation (converging according to
the law of large numbers). An exactly analogous approximation yields
t h ep r e d i c t e dv a l u ef o ran e wc u e :
gM1
NEW,1~
ð
hNEWp hNEWDdt ðÞ dhNEW&
1
S
X S
s~1
hNEW,s ð7Þ
We now turn to some alternative models.
M2: Rescorla-Wagner without generalization. To assess
the predictions of M1 in relation to a null model, we also
considered the predictions under M2, where subjects learn about
each individual without generalization. Under this assumption, the
expected reward (correct choice) can be modeled with classical
Rescorla-Wagner learning [15].
gM2
niz1~gM2
ni zadni
d~oni{gM2
ni
and
gM2
NEW~0:5
ð8Þ
Where oni is still the binary outcome on trial n with the ith cue. One
implementation of M2 - akin to habit learning – would be to
separately initialize the value of guessing ‘purple’ or ‘blue’
(gPURPLE,t, gBLUE,t) to zero and update each only when the
corresponding action was taken [52]. Guesses could then be
modeled according to p PURPLE ðÞ !exp lgPURPLE,t
  
, where l
controls the stochastic precision of the guess. However, because
subjects are told that exactly one option is correct, each outcome is
informative about the counterfactual (unchosen) option. We
therefore initialized gni (the value of the purple guess on trial n in
the presence of each cue i)t o1=2, and defined the value of the blue
choice as 1{gni. Subsequent outcomes oni[f0,1g push gM2
ni up or
down as specified by M2. This agent therefore uses counterfactual
data (from the unchosen option), but does not generalize between
individuals. We fit the free ‘learning rate’ parameter a by
minimizing the error function, E a ðÞ ~
P I
i~1
P Ni
ni~1
(gni a ðÞ {xni)
2,
where xni[f0,1g indicates which option the subject guessed on
the corresponding trial (coded as PURPLE~1,BLUE~0). E a ðÞ
was evaluated numerically for different values of a with increments
of 0:001 within parameter space.
M3–M5: Additional models. The resulting sequence of
value for our two models gM1,gM2 are plotted as a function of trial
number in the dashed and solid curves of Figure 2, for the
sequence of face cues and outcomes presented to our subjects (i.e.
the sequence of blue/purple choices made by each individual).
These correspond to the value of guessing purple under a model
Learning and Generalization under Ambiguity
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of visualization, Figure 2 and 3 interpolate discrete-time model
predictions to form smooth curves. The vertical lines demarking
the context (ambiguous or generalization) are centered on the first
trial of each block.
To ensure we had not overlooked other explanations for the
subjects’ responses, we performed secondary analyses, to establish
the explanatory power of M1 in the context of alternative models,
M3–M5. M3 was a generalization of M2 [15], which represents
and learns the value of contextual (group-membership) cues. This
agent therefore represents 62 cues (60 faces, 2 contextual cues). On
each trial, M3 calls and updates both the context (group) and
individual (face) cues presented on that trial. Defining ot as the
outcome on trial t~1,...,600 and gM3
i,t as the instrumental value
of choosing purple, faced with the ith cue, updates were
implemented with
gM3
i,tz1~gM3
i,t zadi,t
d~oni{
X
i I(i)gM3
i,t
ð9Þ
where the indicator I(i) is 1 whenever the ith cue is present and 0
otherwise. Only values for cues actually present in trial t are
updated. Like M2, this agent uses counterfactual information
(from the unchosen option). Specifically, the value of choosing
‘purple’ on trial n was
P
i I(i)gM3
i,t and the value of choosing ‘blue’
was 1{
P
i I(i)gM3
i,t . Each gM3
i,t was initialized to 0:25 so that prior
to learning ‘blue’ or ‘purple’ were equally valuable; i.e.,
0:5~
P
i I(i)gM3
i,t . The free parameter a was fit to each subject’s
guesses using the same procedure as for M2. M4 modeled a
Bayesian learner that over-generalizes. It has an identical mathemat-
ical form to M1 but unlike M1 does not distinguish between
contexts. It treats all individuals from the two contexts/
populations indiscriminately i.e. as part of one ‘meta-population’.
M5 modeled a Bayesian learner that under-generalizes; In other
words, it can represent uncertainty but cannot generalize. M5, like
M1 and M4, models observations associated with any one
individual as yiDhi*Bin(Ni,hi), but differs in the prior. In
particular, each individual is treated independently with no
generalization within or between groups (the prior over individuals
factorizes). Specifically, we use a Beta prior that resets the prior for
the ith cue to uniform Beta hiD1,1 ðÞ , irrespective of its experience
with other cues. This agent shares a key feature of M2 - resetting
the predictions for each new cue to 0.5 and learning without
generalization. For subsequent trials, it calculates the expected
value of choosing purple as
(yiz1)=(Niz2) ð10Þ
where yi is still the count of correct purple choices with cue i (see
above and [49]). In practice this agent’s predictions are similar to
M2.
Relating model predictions to data
Behavior. We used logistic regression to predict trial-by-trial
choices from the value (expected reward) based on M1, while
including the value derived from models M2{M5 as additional
nuisance covariates. We calculated within-subject point estimates
of the partial regression coefficients of M1 predictions, before
testing for significant (nonzero) effects at the between-subject level
using standard classical statistics.
Figure 2. Subject’s predicted value (expected reward) for guessing ‘purple’, according to model-based (M1, red-dashed) and
model-free (M2, black) schemes. M1 tracks current information when necessary (AC), and otherwise exploits generalization to limit the impact of
spurious outcomes on action (GC). M2 is ignorant about each new individual and myopically chases reward. Red circles indicate the actual guesses of
a typical subject.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002346.g002
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approach in which the parametric effects of variables from our
formal Bayesian model were used to predict the amplitude of
fMRI responses, after convolution with a suitable hemodynamic
response function [53]. Because the majority of experimental
variation in the model predictions is between conditions (AC vs.
GC), we arranged these conditions in a block design to ensure
high efficiency. We could therefore choose either a conventional
analysis that simply tested for condition effects or a model-based
analysis that used parametric variations within and between
conditions. To exploit our formal model, we used the more
comprehensive model-based analysis: The fMRI data were
modeled using a general linear convolution model, whose
explanatory variables comprised stimulus functions convolved
with a canonical hemodynamic response function. These
stimulus functions comprised delta functions modulated by the
following:
1) The prediction ‘risk’ under M1 (time-locked to the choice
presentation): 2) The reward predictions under M1, conditioned
on the subject’s choice (time-locked to the choice): 3) The model-
based (Shannon) surprise at the outcome under M1 (time-locked to
the outcome): 4) The signed model-based prediction error under
M1, conditional on subject’s choice (time-locked to the outcome):
5) the trial outcome: correct/incorrect, coded at 1,0 respectively
(time-locked to the outcome). In terms of our hypothesis, these
regressors can be regarded as modeling nuisance effects. Our final
regressor was the key effect of interest; namely, the trial specific
ambiguity as measured by the Shannon entropy above. It is this
measure that reflects an encoding of contextual uncertainty that
weakens generalization. The entropy entered as parametrically
modulated delta functions at the time of choice, but before
feedback. Six columns describing scan-specific rigid body
translations and rotations were included as confounds. The data
was temporally filtered to remove low-frequency drifts below 1/
128 Hz.
Results
Figure 2 shows the value (expected reward) of each choice
according to the two main learning models we considered,
together with a typical subject’s guesses. Model 1 (M1) generalizes,
while Model 2 (M2) cannot. For each subject, we used logistic
regression to explain their choices in terms of these predictions and
a constant term. Using a between-subject summary-statistic
approach, we applied a two-tailed Student’s t-test to the subject-
specific logistic regression coefficients associated with the predic-
tions of M1 (red-dashed curve, Figure 2). We rejected the null
hypothesis that this effect was equal to zero (p~0:00041, n~19).
Interestingly, the size of the M1 regression coefficient predicted the
total number of rewards obtained by each subject (correlation
r~0:651, p~0:0025n~19). This illustrates that generalization is
evident behaviorally and pays off.
A secondary behavioral analysis assessed the specificity of M1
predictions by examining the explanatory power of M1 in the
context of the alternative models, M2 to M5. For each subject, we
used logistic regression to explain subject’s choices as a mixture of
predictions from five models (M1 to M5), plus a constant term.
Having estimated the logistic regression model for each subject, we
again considered the subject-specific estimates for the coefficient
reporting on M1 predictions. A two-tailed Student’s t-test on the
M1 coefficients was highly significant, p~0:00069, N~19.N o
other model coefficients reached significance.
To summarize, we used standard regression techniques to ask if,
having accounted for competing models, a component of choice
behavior reflects Bayes-optimal generalization (M1). Specifically,
we included several model predictions in one linear model and
estimated the partial regression coefficient for the predictor of
interest (action-values derived from M1). One can therefore [54]
conclude that, over and above competing models, behavior can be
predicted by M1. Because Models M2 and M3 have a free
parameter this conclusion is conservative: having been pre-fit to
Figure 3. Degree of learning formalized as prior uncertainty about the reinforcement contingencies, in M1. Without evidence of a
contextual norm (in the AC) subjects are uncertain about what to do with an unfamiliar person, and must learn quickly. This time-series, convolved
with a hemodynamic response function predicted hippocampal fMRI responses (see main text).
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002346.g003
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that is unavailable to M1 (or M4 and M5). In contrast to M2 (Eq.
8), M1 attempts to explain behavior via abstract computational
principles, not detailed mechanisms. Its predictions have no free
parameters. Rather, its predictions are based only on the subject’s
observations under ideal Bayesian assumptions. We have demon-
strated that this model predicts behavior, above and beyond that
explained by the other models considered. In what follows, we
now ask whether the brain encodes ambiguity [see e.g. [39] for a
similar approach].
While M1 differs from other models in many ways, the
important aspect for the fMRI analysis is that M1 provides an
ambiguity measure. We therefore tested the null hypothesis that
the fMRI signal is sensitive to ambiguity, as quantified by the
Shannon entropy of prior belief (see above). In our fMRI data,
fourteen subjects satisfied the inclusion criteria for a second-level
between subject analysis (no interruptions to the scanner session or
rapid head movement, as estimated by co-registration). We
conducted regional and whole-brain analyses. All fMRI results
presented here are based on the same general linear model,
including the confounding factors (i.e., with nine regressors). In
view of our specific hypothesis, region of interest (ROI) analyses
asked whether activity within bilateral hippocampi tracked
ambiguity about the current contingencies. Figure 4a shows the
anatomy of the ROI.
Figure 3 depicts ambiguity about a new individual (alternating
block-wise between GC and AC blocks). As discussed, this dictates
the relative influence of the current observation on belief updates
(higher when there is high ambiguity). The parameter estimates
associated with the entropy regressor above were averaged over
bilateral hippocampal voxels for each subject, using the AAL atlas
[55]. We applied a two-tailed Student’s t-test to these subject-
specific summaries, testing the null hypothesis that hippocampal
responses do not covary with ambiguity. We were able to reject
this null hypothesis with a correct p~0:0245, n~14. Repeating
the analysis on unilateral right and left hippocampus separately
provided similar results (p~0:0303, p~0:0328, respectively).
(These latter two results examine the separate contribution of
each hemisphere to our bi-lateral effect. These tests are not
statistically independent of the bi-lateral test and were not subject
to additional correction.) There was no significant difference
between left and right hippocampi. Our results therefore suggest
that neuronal activity encodes the same sorts of variables that arise
in our Bayes-optimal computations and, consequently, may be
performing some form of approximate Bayesian inference.
As with the behavioral data, we next examined the between-
subject correlation between the hippocampal ambiguity coeffi-
cients and the total number of rewards attained in the experiment
(correlation r~0:554, p~0:0399n~14). Testing for separate
correlations in left and right hippocampal effects gave respectively:
r~0:624, p~0:0172 and r~0:4265, p~0:1283 (n~14).
In an exploratory whole brain analysis, we then smoothed the
data with a Gaussian Kernel FWHM~ 4mm 4mm 4mm ½  and re-
estimated the general linear model above using a conventional
SPM analysis with whole brain correction for multiple compar-
isons [56]. Two right-hemisphere clusters survived correction for
cluster-extent (using a height threshold of 3). The first region
(p~0:04 FWE corrected) subsumed a right hippocampal region,
mostly hippocampus and amygdala, but also putamen, as defined
with the AAL atlas [55]. The second region (p~0:031 FWE
corrected) encompassed the fusiform gyrus and precuneus, with a
spill-over into a calcarine region. These regions are shown in
maximum intensity projection format in Figure 4b (this display
format shows voxels with maximum intensity that fall on parallel
lines traced from the viewpoint to the plane of projection as in a
standard X-Ray). Orthogonal views of the anterior activation at its
local maximum are shown in Figure 4c. For illustration purposes,
Figure 4d shows the mean times series in this anterior region,
averaged over all subjects. All of the above fMRI analyses were
based on the same model, which included the nuisance regressors
listed in Relating model predictions to data: fMRI. None of
these nuisance effects could explain the variation in hippocampal
responses that was explained by our Bayes-optimal generalization
model (M1).
Discussion
Behaviorally, we have shown that subjects learn action-reward
relationships in a manner that enables them to generalize rules to
new situations. Crucially, this enables subjects to adapt their
learning rate to provide an optimal balance between pre-existing
generalizations and new information. We established this by
showing that the accuracy of subjects’ guesses evolved over trials in
a way that was predicted by Bayes-optimal generalization, using a
statistical model equipped with prior beliefs that allowed for
contextual ambiguity. Furthermore, we established that a
significant component of hippocampal responses could be
explained by fluctuations in ambiguity under this model. These
regionally specific responses were also significant in a whole brain
SPM analysis.
We provide empirical support for a model that explains how
experience moderates decision making. In this model, the bias
towards rule-based choices is determined by low ambiguity. We
show that both learning and hippocampal responses are
attenuated when the underlying rule is learned and applied in
an unambiguous context. Conventional ‘model-free’ reinforce-
ment learning cannot easily explain such effects because these
schemes do not include contextual ambiguity. As noted in the
introduction, one recent variant of reinforcement learning [43] is
relevant here: In this two-system learning theory, generalization
between observable cues rests both on their perceptual similarity
and their predictive similarity (do cues look the same? do they
predict the same outcomes?). The authors of [43] contrast normal
learning with under/over-generalization or ‘under/over willing-
ness to generate a new state’ p 97. We have used a single model
that formalizes this optimality by drawing on principles of optimal
probabilistic generalization (see [42] for a related model). As in
[43], our model generalizes by classifying observable cues before
acting. Unlike [43], it invokes an explicit representation of
subjective ambiguity to mediate and optimize this generalization.
There remains an interesting challenge to relate our formulation
and results to classical RL schemes. Interestingly the authors of
[43] speculate that the neuronal systems mediating generalization
depend on the hippocampus (and PFC); because these systems are
flexible, the rules by which observable cues are classified can easily
be changed to permit new discriminations. These speculations are
entirely consistent with our findings.
As in previous treatments [14], we distinguish uncertainty about
objective, observable events (e.g., the risk of getting ‘tails’ in a fair
coin flip) from subjective ambiguity about unobservable states or
parameters (is the coin really fair?). While the hippocampus has
been implicated in the former [23,35,57], the latter is central to
computational accounts of contextual learning and inference; e.g.
[1,22]. Using a Bayes-optimal model, our work provides the first
evidence that the hippocampus tracks contextual ambiguity about
hidden or latent variables.
Previous work [11,14,39,58] has addressed how ambiguity
mediates the influence of uncued temporal variability (volatility) on
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different cues influences creates ambiguity and influences learning.
In the current study, we manipulated the uncertainty about the
behavioral contingencies over contexts, rather than time, and
showed that associative learning adapts accordingly. Further work
could examine whether neuromodulatory manipulations influence
this effect; e.g., by selectively facilitating synaptic gain as predicted
by [11,59]. The role of dopamine deserves special attention, given
Figure 4. Structural MRI, mask and functional activation. (a) Structural region-of-interest (white) on the subjects’ average anatomical image.
For visualization, black blobs exceed the 0.05 level uncorrected threshold corresponding to a Student’s t (13 df). See the main text for statistical
inference at a corrected p,0.05 level. (b,c) Whole brain analysis of the effect of ambiguity. (b) Shows a glass-brain view (maximum intensity
projection) of significant activations. (c) Shows the anterior activation, which included right anterior hippocampus and amygdala as defined,
superimposed on the subjects’ average anatomical image. (d) The observed fMRI trial-by-trial time-series (blue) averaged over all subjects for the
hippocampal activation identified in our whole brain analysis (see main text). The model-based ambiguity is shown in red. Note that the model only
captures the slow changes in observed responses over blocks as the contingencies are learned.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002346.g004
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Additionally, given that the amygdala is able to modulate memory
storage in non-amygdala brain areas [61], multi-region in vivo
recordings could disclose interactions with the hippocampus in
these tasks. Interestingly, the amygdala activation in our whole-
brain analyses is consistent with previous work implicating the
amygdala in the representation of ambiguity [24,62]. However,
previous studies were unable to address whether ambiguity
regulates learning, as predicted theoretically. In line with Bayesian
learning theory, our results suggest that learning (updating beliefs)
can be guided by optimal probabilistic constraints, generalized
from previous experience.
The learning rate in (model-free) reinforcement learning
prescribes the sensitivity of belief updates to current information.
When this information is under or over-weighted, inefficient
learning ensues. While classical RL is non-probabilistic (i.e. has a
degraded uncertainty representation [22]), it may in principle
address this challenge by incorporating something akin to an
‘ambiguity-dependent’ or ‘surprise-dependent’ learning rate. For
example, attempts have been made to optimise learning rates
[63,64] in both stationary and non-stationary settings [65].
Bayesian learners use the rules of probability to achieve this
balance by weighing new information against pre-existing
generalizations. The relative weight of the latter depends upon
ambiguity (the relative confidence in prior beliefs about the
current context). When pre-existing beliefs are held with a high
degree of confidence, they generally accommodate new observa-
tions, by down-weighting their impact. Such abilities to balance
different sources of information and constraints are at the heart of
adaptive behavior [66]. For example, appropriate social behavior
requires communal norms, while retaining sensitivity to individual
inclinations and preferences. The (social) learning task in this
paper is a first step in this direction. Conversely, aberrant
generalization has widespread consequences [2,3,5,67]. The
framework used in this study may provide an experimental
framework to quantify dysfunctional generalization in specific
patients; e.g., over-generalized schemata which persist despite
contradictory evidence, as seen in depressive and delusional states
and its associated pathophysiology at the neuronal level.
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